

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

For

Jennifer Raymond Dresden and Marc Morjé Howard (2015): “Authoritarian Backsliding and the Concentration of Political Power,” *Democratization*, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2015.1045884.

APPENDIX A: BACKSLIDING TYPES

Index Variable	Component Variable	Scale	Description
Unfair Elections ¹		0-3	Higher values on the scale indicate higher levels of repression. Backsliding is coded as any increase in the “Unfair Elections” score from one election to the next. ²
	Major Candidates Barred (NELDA)	0-1	NELDA13 – “Were opposition leaders prevented from running?”
	Electoral Abuse (NELDA)	0-1	NELDA11 – “Before elections, are there significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair?”
	Opposition Prevented from Campaigning (NELDA)	0-1	NELDA15 – “Is there evidence that the government harassed the opposition?”
Violation of Civil Liberties ³		0-3	Each annually-coded component is adjusted to a fraction and added to form this index. Backsliding is coded as an increase of 0.5 or more.
	Freedom of the Press (Freedom House)	0-2	This measure is comprised of the Freedom of the Press Status. A status of “Not Free” is assigned a score of 2, “Partly Free” a score of 1, and “Free” a score of 0.
	Restrictions of Political Association or Free Speech (HRD)	0-2	This is comprised of the Association variable and inverted to match other variables so that higher values indicate more restrictive policies.
	Attacks on Opposition (HRD)	0-8	This variable creates an index of the use of torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killing, and disappearances. The scale is inverted so that higher values indicate more restrictive policies.

¹ Data for the “Unfair Elections” measure comes from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset (Hyde and Marinov, “Which Elections”).

² Where elections had multiple rounds, the round with the highest score was used. Manipulation can take place in any part of an election process, and so its absence in one area should not be considered an absence overall. Where there was no difference in the scores among rounds, we used the first round data. Where subsequent rounds of an election fall into a different calendar year (as in a first-round presidential election held in December and a run-off held in January), the results are coded for the year of the *first* round of the election.

³ Data for the “Civil Liberties” measure comes from Freedom House’s Press Freedom Index (Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press”) and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, “CIRI”).

Uneven Playing Field ⁴		0-9	This index is a simple sum of the indicators below. Higher values indicate a political playing field that is more heavily skewed towards the incumbent. Backsliding is coded as any increase in the index from one executive election year to the next
	Overall Structural Environment (IEO)	0-3	RO1STR. Overall structural environment. Ranges from 0 (Good – no problems) to 3 (High – major problems).
	Media (IEO)	0-3	R113R. Ranges from 0 (Good – no problems) to 3 (High – major problems).
	Complaints about Electoral Commission Conduct (IEO)	0-3	R122R. Ranges from 0 (Good – no problems) to 3 (High – major problems).
Executive Constraints ⁵		1-7	This data is taken from Polity IV and is coded annually. The scale is inverted such that higher values indicate fewer constraints on the executive. Backsliding is coded as any increase in the inverted scale.

⁴ Data for the “Uneven Playing Field” measure is taken from the Project on International Election Monitoring (Kelley, *Monitoring Democracy*).

⁵ The Executive Constraints measure is taken from the XCONST component of the Polity IV Index (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers, “Polity IV”).

APPENDIX B: BACKSLIDING EPISODES

Albania	1991, 1993, 1996, 2000
Algeria	1992, 1999
Armenia	2000, 2002
Azerbaijan	1993, 1995
Burkina Faso	2000, 2004
Cambodia	2003, 2004
Central African Republic	2000
Comoros	2002
Congo (Brazzaville, Republic of Congo)	1993, 1996
Croatia	1995, 1997
Fiji	1992, 2004
Gabon	1993, 2003
Gambia	2000, 2004
Georgia	1997, 2000
Ghana	1995, 1999
Guinea	1993
Guinea-Bissau	1996, 2002
Haiti	2001, 2003
Kazakhstan	1994
Kenya	1995, 1997, 2002
Kyrgyzstan	1996, 1998, 2000
Liberia	2003
Malawi	2004
Mozambique	1997, 1999
Nepal	1993
Niger	2004
Nigeria	2003
Papua New Guinea	1996, 1999, 2001
Peru	1998
Romania	1996
Russian Federation	1993, 1995, 1999
Rwanda	2003
Senegal	1994, 1997
Serbia and Montenegro	1993
Singapore	1991, 1994, 2002
Sri Lanka	1996, 1998
Tajikistan	2003
Tanzania	1997, 2000
Thailand	1992

Tunisia	1994, 2000, 2002
Uganda	2003
Yemen	1994, 1996
Yugoslavia	1990
Zambia	1998, 2001, 2003
Zimbabwe	2001

APPENDIX C: ALTERNATIVE SAMPLES

In the main paper, we defined hybrid regimes as those regimes in which there are multiple parties (at least one of which is not aligned with the party in power), as coded by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, and in which the overall Polity IV score is between -5 and 5, corresponding to the Polity definition of “anocracy.” Expanding the sample to include all anocracies by dropping the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland criteria does not change the findings. Expanding the sample to include all multiparty systems under the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland definition without any reference to Polity score does not change our finding from Model 2 with regards to economic performance and natural resources. The finding regarding opposition electoral gains is not robust in this sample, but this is not surprising given that a sample of all multiparty regimes would include liberal democracies in which electoral competition and turnover are more common.

	(1) Full Sample (Model 2, Table 1)	(2) Polity Sample	(3) Cheibub et al. Sample
<i>GDP growth</i>	0.0601*** (0.0233)	0.0579** (0.0225)	0.0377** (0.0175)
<i>Rents</i>	0.0180*** (0.00629)	0.0234*** (0.00436)	0.0231*** (0.00698)
<i>GDP growth * Rents</i>	-0.00555*** (0.00155)	-0.00531*** (0.00138)	-0.00486*** (0.00116)
<i>Opposition Gains</i>	0.606** (0.257)	0.720*** (0.249)	0.130 (0.139)
<i>Executive Election</i>	1.115*** (0.272)	1.100*** (0.252)	1.168*** (0.174)
<i>Ln(GDP per capita)</i>	-0.0537 (0.0986)	-0.00214 (0.0946)	-0.308*** (0.0586)
<i>Prior Backslides</i>	-0.127 (0.123)	-0.0864 (0.112)	0.242*** (0.0695)
<i>t</i>	1.164*** (0.319)	1.245*** (0.303)	0.970*** (0.170)
<i>t²</i>	-0.188*** (0.0628)	-0.195*** (0.0594)	-0.136*** (0.0276)
<i>t³</i>	0.00852** (0.00340)	0.00875*** (0.00323)	0.00520*** (0.00119)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.676*** (0.801)	-4.380*** (0.796)	-2.002*** (0.513)
<i>Observations</i>	480	568	1,739
<i>Countries</i>	64	73	134

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Works Cited

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